Saturday, August 10, 2013

Welcome to Head Quarters, The Guardian's New Psychology and Neuroscience Blog

The Guardian (UK) has a new psychology and neuroscience blog called Head Quarters. This post is their introduction to the group blog (there are four bloggers), and here is a summary excerpt:
[W]e welcome you to Head Quarters, a new home at the Guardian science network for all things weird and wonderful in psychology. Our aim is to highlight both the startling insights that make psychology so fascinating, as well as the challenges we face as we interrogate the mind's secrets – not as journalistic outsiders, but as scientific insiders with ideas about how to improve matters.
The four bloggers are Pete Etchells, a biological psychologist at Bath Spa University, whose work focuses on human vision and cognition, the behavioural impact of technology use, and the culture and practices within academic research.; Molly Crockett, a social neuroscientist at University College London studying the neurobiology of morality, altruism and decision-making; Thalia Gjersoe, a developmental psychologist at the Open University who studies the development of reasoning in children and the basis of magical beliefs in both children and adults; and Chris Chambers, a cognitive neuroscientist at Cardiff University, with interests in human cognition and addiction, reforming scientific research practices, and the interplay between science, media and government.

Pieces of mind: introducing the Guardian's new psychology blog

Welcome to Head Quarters, the Guardian's new centre of operations for psychology

Psychologists face a unique challenge: we use our minds to study the mind. The observer and the observed are one and the same. Photograph: Alamy

Ask any psychologist and they'll tell you without hesitation that the most common question they get asked at parties is "Can you read my mind?" Media reports perpetuate this myth, claiming that brain scans can show "exactly what a person is imagining" or that "you love your iPhone". But stories like these paint a distorted picture of what psychologists actually do.

Psychology is a science. Imagine a scientist and you'll probably think of someone in a white lab coat examining cells by observing them through a microscope. Psychological scientists examine human thoughts and emotions by observing people's behavior and brain activity. We ask questions like: what is the mind? How does the chemistry and biology of the brain create the mind? How does the brain remember the past and imagine the future? How do we control our desires? How do we decide what is right or wrong?

In tackling these questions, psychological science faces a unique challenge: we use our minds to study the mind. The observer and the observed are one and the same. What's more, each and every one of us thinks we understand our own mind pretty darn well, and this can sometimes lead us astray. Indeed, some of the most famous discoveries in psychology are those that question our most cherished beliefs about ourselves – for instance, that most of us would never cause harm to others, or that we know what will make us happy, or that performance-based pay improves motivation.

That's why the scientific method is so important: when used correctly, it can protect us from our deep-seated biases about how the mind works and instead reveal to us glimpses of its true nature. Yet psychology is perhaps one of those areas of science that has been most visibly open to abuse in recent years, from misrepresentation of genuine research by the media and private industry, to academic fraud and questionable research practices.

So it's with all of these things in mind (pardon the pun), that we welcome you to Head Quarters, a new home at the Guardian science network for all things weird and wonderful in psychology. Our aim is to highlight both the startling insights that make psychology so fascinating, as well as the challenges we face as we interrogate the mind's secrets – not as journalistic outsiders, but as scientific insiders with ideas about how to improve matters.

Throughout this journey, we'll delve into current affairs and look at the psychological science behind politics, entertainment, business and sport. We'll scrutinize health claims related to psychology, showcase exciting new discoveries about the mind, and debunk bad science. Above all, we hope you'll also get involved by commenting on our pieces and pointing us toward issues you find interesting or that demand public attention.

Our quartet of writers includes scientists based at four British universities. Pete Etchells is a biological psychologist at Bath Spa University. His work focuses on human vision and cognition, the behavioral impact of technology use, and the culture and practices within academic research. Molly Crockett is a social neuroscientist at University College London studying the neurobiology of morality, altruism and decision-making.

Thalia Gjersoe is a developmental psychologist at the Open University. She studies the development of reasoning in children and the basis of magical beliefs in both children and adults. Chris Chambers is a cognitive neuroscientist at Cardiff University, with interests in human cognition and addiction, reforming scientific research practices, and the interplay between science, media and government.

We realize that some readers will look on psychology with enthusiasm, others with scepticism, and others – like ourselves – with a healthy dose of both. Our target audience is anyone who is interested in the science of the mind. And when it comes down to it, isn't that pretty much everyone?

Follow the Head Quarters team on Twitter: @PeteEtchells@MollyCrockett, @NathaliaGjersoe and @chrisdc77

TED Blog - Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Voice Hearing (But Were Too Afraid to Ask)


Eleanor Longden is the author of Learning from the Voices in My Head, a book in which she chronicles her experience of hearing voices, struggling with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, and her eventual befriending of the voices.

This is a topic close to my heart - many of the clients I deal with hear voices and none of them are schizophrenic. As an advocate of the Internal Family Systems model of therapy, I generally attempt to bring the voices into the therapeutic alliance. This process requires the client to befriend the voices and approach them with compassion and curiosity - two of the 8 c-words indicating the client is in Self and not in a part (all 8 of the c-words: calmness, curiosity, clarity, compassion, confidence, creativity, courage, and connectedness).

Everything you ever wanted to know about voice hearing (but were too afraid to ask)

Posted by: Michelle Quint
August 8, 2013




Eleanor Longden gave a candid talk about the fact that she hears voices at TED2013. Today, we also release her TED Book, which delves further into her experience in the mental health system. Below, all the questions you’d want to ask Longden. Photo: James Duncan Davidson



During her freshman year of college, Eleanor Longden began hearing voices: a narrator describing her actions as she went about her day. Diagnosed with schizophrenia, Longden began what she describes as a “psychic civil war,” fighting to stop the voices as they became antagonistic. Eleanor Longden: The voices in my head. What helped her was something unexpected: making peace with them. By learning to see the voices as a source of insight rather than a symptom, Longden took control.

What’s it like to hear voices? Read Eleanor’s FAQ below — where she tells you everything you wanted to know about voice hearing, with her signature honesty and humor.

Want more? Longden first spoke during our Worldwide Talent Search; then told a longer version of her journey toward acceptance of her own mind on the mainstage at TED2013. And today, Longden premieres her TED Book, delving deeper into her experience. Learning from the Voices in My Head is available for the Kindle, the Nook and through the iBookstore.

Do your voices ever talk to each other (and exclude you)?

Sometimes. In the old days they would talk about me a lot more, but now they usually speak to me directly. And when they do discuss me, it’s more likely to be compliments or positive encouragement. Or sometimes they’ll discuss something I’m worried about and debate possible solutions. There’s one particular voice that will repeat helpful mantras to the others. A recent one was: “If you can do something about it, there’s no need to worry. And if you can’t do anything about it, there’s no point in worrying!”

Do the voices sound like they are coming from inside your head or through your ears?

This is something else that’s changed a bit over time. They used to be more external, but now tend to be internal or outside, but very close to my ears. It can also vary depending on which voice is speaking.

What would you miss if you lost the voices? Would you be lonely?

My voices are an important part of my identity – literally, they are part of me – so yes, I would miss them if they went. I should probably insure them actually, because if they do ever go I’ll be out of a job! This seems extraordinary given how desperate I used to be to get rid of them. But they provide me with a lot of insights about myself, and they hold a very rich repertoire of different memories and emotions. They’re also very useful when I do public speaking, as they’ll often remind me if I’ve missed something. They can be helpful with general knowledge quizzes too! One of them even used to recite answers during my university exams. Peter Bullimore, a trustee of the English Hearing Voices Network, published a beautiful children’s book that was dictated to him by his voices.

Do your voices ever overlap? Could they harmonize?

They sometimes talk over each other, but don’t really say the same things in unison. I’ve met people whose voices do that though, like a chorus. Other people sometimes describe voices that sound like a football crowd, or a group talking at a party. At a recent conference, I heard a really extraordinary fact: that people who’ve been deaf from birth don’t hear voices, but see hands signing at them.

Do your voices happen all the time? Like, even during sex? Do you have to shush them during a movie?

No, not all the time! Although they’re often more active (and sometimes more negative or antagonistic) when I’m stressed. Even this can be useful though, as it’s a reminder to take some time out and look after myself. I relate to them so much better now, so if they become intrusive and I ask them to be quiet in a calm, respectful way — then 99% of the time they would.

Can you make certain voices pop up at will?

Yes, some of the time. Actually, this was something I used several years ago during therapy – my therapist would say for example, “I’d like to speak with the voice that’s very angry,” or “the voice that talks a lot about [a particular traumatic event],” and he’d dialogue with it.

Is there a time when you want to hear voices or are you always trying to get them to be quiet?

I sometimes discuss dilemmas or problems with them, or ask their opinion about decisions, although I would never let them dictate something to me that I didn’t want to do – it’s like negotiating between different parts of yourself to reach a conclusion ‘everyone’ is happy with. So, for example, maybe there’s a voice that represents a part of me that’s very insecure, which will have different needs, to a part of me that wants to go out into the world and be heard. Or the needs of very rational, intellectual voice may initially feel incompatible with those of a very emotional one. But then I can identify that conflict within myself and try to resolve it. It’s quite rare now that I have to tell them to be quiet, as they don’t intrude or impose on me in the way that they used to. If they do become invasive then it’s important for me to understand why, and there’ll always be a good reason. In general, it’ll be a sign of some sort of emotional conflict, which can then be addressed in a positive, constructive way.

Do you ever confuse your internal voice with ‘the voices’?

No, they feel quite distinct.

When you talk back to the voices, do they react differently if you speak out loud or just think your response?

I rarely respond to them out loud now, but they wouldn’t react differently to when I ‘speak’ to them internally.

What’s the difference between schizophrenia and voice hearing?

While the experiences that get labeled as symptoms of schizophrenia –and the distress associated with them — are very real, the idea that there’s a discrete, biologically-based condition called schizophrenia is increasingly being contested all over the world. While voice hearing is linked with a range of different psychiatric conditions (including many non-psychotic ones), many people with no history of mental health problems hear voices. It’s also widely recognized as part of different spiritual and cultural experiences.

Do you feel like other voice hearers understand you better?

They can appreciate what it’s like more precisely, but I’m fortunate enough to have met some really empathic, imaginative non-voice hearers who really want to understand too. In this respect, I think there’s actually more continuity between voices and everyday psychological experience then a lot of people realize. For example, everyone knows what it’s like to have intrusive thoughts. And most of us recognize the sense of having more than one part of ourselves: a part that’s very critical, a part that wants to please everyone, a part that’s preoccupied with negative events, a part that is playful and irresponsible and gets us into trouble, and so on. I think voices often feel more disowned and externalized, but represent a similar process.

What makes the voices talk more at some moments than others?

Usually emotional experiences, both positive and negative. In the early days, identifying these ‘triggers’ were very helpful in making more sense of why the voices were there and what they represented.

Do the voices ever make you laugh out loud?

Yes, sometimes! Some can be very outrageous with their humor, very daring, whereas others have a droll, Bill Hicks-like cynicism. Well, maybe not quite like Bill Hicks. Wouldn’t that be great though … having Bill Hicks in your head!

Friday, August 09, 2013

Believing We Can Predict the Future Makes Us Believe We Can Control the Future


Ever wonder why people read their horoscopes daily? Or why people pay psychics, Tarot card readers, and other purveyors of future predictions, even though there is no research anywhere supporting these prognosticators or their methods?

Apparently, these researchers did:
Every year thousands of dollars are spent on psychics who claim to “know” the future. The present research questions why, despite no evidence that humans are able to psychically predict the future, do people persist in holding irrational beliefs about precognition? 
What they found is that a belief in our ability to predict the future provides us with a sense of control, especially for those who feel low in control. Three different experimental designs all supported this basic finding.

Now you know.

Loss of Control Increases Belief in Precognition and Belief in Precognition Increases Control


Katharine H. Greenaway, Winnifred R. Louis, Matthew J. Hornsey

Abstract

Every year thousands of dollars are spent on psychics who claim to “know” the future. The present research questions why, despite no evidence that humans are able to psychically predict the future, do people persist in holding irrational beliefs about precognition? We argue that believing the future is predictable increases one’s own perceived ability to exert control over future events. As a result, belief in precognition should be particularly strong when people most desire control–that is, when they lack it. In Experiment 1 (N = 87), people who were experimentally induced to feel low in control reported greater belief in precognition than people who felt high in control. Experiment 2 (N = 53) investigated whether belief in precognition increases perceived control. Consistent with this notion, providing scientific evidence that precognition is possible increased feelings of control relative to providing scientific evidence that precognition was not possible. Experiment 3 (N = 132) revealed that when control is low, believing in precognition helps people to feel in control once more. Prediction therefore acts as a compensatory mechanism in times of low control. The present research provides new insights into the psychological functions of seemingly irrational beliefs, like belief in psychic abilities.

Full Citation: 
Greenaway KH, Louis WR, Hornsey MJ. (2013, Aug 7). Loss of Control Increases Belief in Precognition and Belief in Precognition Increases Control. PLoS ONE 8(8): e71327. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0071327

Introduction

The human mind is predisposed toward prediction. We are constantly driven to look forward, envisage the future, and infer what will happen [1]. These cognitive mechanisms serve important functions in enabling survival and reproductive advantage, and also act to reduce psychological uncertainty about the future. Our natural orientation towards prediction can sometimes manifest in extreme ways, with some people going so far as to postulate that humans may have developed an ability to predict the future. The multi-million dollar industry of psychic readings, clairvoyance, and astrology testifies to people’s fascination with this idea. One in four Americans believes in precognition [2]. Even the attention of the scientific community has been captured by recent claims that precognition exists [3], [4]. It seems strange considering humans are more scientifically and intellectually advanced than ever before, that irrational beliefs about precognition can persist and be maintained. The present research seeks to explain this phenomenon.

Psychological Pull of Paranormal Beliefs

It is clear that people are drawn to the idea that it is possible to psychically predict the future, that is, access information about what will happen before it has happened. What is less well understood is why people hold these beliefs, and what function these beliefs serve. Although precognitive abilities would confer decided adaptive advantages from an evolutionary perspective, current scientific knowledge indicates that humans do not and probably cannot predict the future through psychic means [5], [6]. From a purely rational perspective, it is unclear what benefit people might gain from believing in something that does not exist. From a psychological perspective, it makes sense that beliefs that help people attain a desired end state such as feeling happy, safe, and secure will be differentially endorsed.

Even the most extreme beliefs may be beneficial when they help people deal with stress or threat. For example, superstitious beliefs and behaviors such as wearing a “lucky charm” have been found to enhance performance [7], to protect against negative outcomes under stress [8],[9], and to be positively correlated with feelings of control [10], [11]. Sports players use superstitious strategies to attempt to bring about a desired outcome in a game [12], [13]. Times of economic stress reliably coincide with an increase in the number of articles on astrology and other psychic phenomena [14]. Many Western societies may be experiencing another such peak in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis and the events of September 11, 2001 [15][17].

Stressful or challenging experiences therefore often seem to go hand-in-hand with interest in paranormal phenomena. Some researchers even argue that paranormal beliefs, and belief in precognition in particular, may develop as part of a specialized psychological coping mechanism in the service of managing feelings of threat [18], [19], [20]. Specifically, such beliefs are thought to aid people in threatening circumstances by conferring a sense of control.

If it is possible to predict what the future holds, then one can exert control. That is, by knowing what will happen, people can act in a way to bring about positive outcomes and avoid negative outcomes. For instance, one could earn money by knowing the outcome of a particular sporting match, or remain safe by choosing to avoid the site of a future accident. Having insight into what will happen in the future would therefore allow people to control their outcomes in a way that would guarantee personal success and survival. Accordingly, we argue that believing the future is predictable, even through psychic means, should increase people’s perceived ability for control.

A wealth of correlational evidence exists to show that belief in precognition is positively associated with perceived control [19][21], [23]. It is clear, therefore, that belief in precognition and control are reciprocally intertwined. Yet, the existence of a correlation does not provide information about whether belief in precognition provides people with a sense of control, or whether challenges to control lead to the endorsement of precognitive beliefs, or whether both processes operate. The present research tested these relationships experimentally.

Compensating for Compromised Control

Humans are motivated to feel in control of their environments and outcomes [24], [25]. The impulse is unsurprising, given that people who experience high perceived control tend to live happier, healthier, and more productive lives than people who do not [25][29]. As a result of this drive, people act in order to regain perceived control when deprived of it [24], [30], [31]. Accordingly, humans have developed a variety of psychological strategies to combat feelings of uncontrollability.

When control is deprived, people may attempt to regain it through primary or secondary means. A primary method would be to change the situation that engendered feelings of uncontrollability[24], [31]. Alternatively, people may engage in secondary–or compensatory–strategies to increase perceived control [32][40]. Secondary control strategies are often used when people lack actual control over their circumstances. They involve changing one’s desires to fit with the current circumstances, rather than changing the circumstances to fit with one’s desires (i.e., primary control). To this end, individuals adjust their own attitudes, beliefs, and desires to help themselves feel more in control of an uncontrollable situation.

Rothbaum and colleagues [24] published a comprehensive review of secondary strategies that people use to cope with situations of uncontrollability. One secondary response that they outlined is a strategy termed predictive control, in which people strive to predict future events in order to be able to better exert control. Some scholars have even defined desire for control as the motive to “render the world predictable” ([41], p.551). If a predictive control strategy is utilized, then beliefs that are associated with predictability should be preferentially favored when people find themselves in situations of low control.

Precognition as Predictive Control

Precognitive abilities would allow people to predict the future, thus belief in these abilities should be differentially endorsed when people most desire prediction–that is, in situations of low control. We posit therefore that belief in precognition is a predictive control strategy that people can turn to when feeling low in control. As a result, we hypothesize that loss of control will cause an increase in belief in precognition. Certainly loss of control has been found to increase other types of paranormal beliefs–like superstition–which also include an element of being able to predict, or at least guide, the future [11]. In the case of precognition, people have a direct and exact channel to knowing the future through psychic means. These types of beliefs should therefore be particularly attractive as predictive control strategies in so far as they give people the illusion of being able to predict (and therefore control) the future.

The present research aimed first to determine whether loss of control increases belief in precognition. Our second aim was to determine whether these beliefs do indeed serve as a predictive control strategy, by testing whether belief in precognition increases perceived control. In combining these research questions we will be theoretically advancing the control literature. To date, control researchers have focused on cataloguing the range of strategies people engage in when low in control [11], [32], [35], [39], [40]. Implicit in this literature is the assumption that these compensatory control strategies act to restore perceived control when it has been lost. Research suggests that control strategies do serve this function: They are associated with feelings of control [42], reduce anxious arousal when control has been depleted [37] and can help to meet a need for order and structure [38]. Although this evidence is suggestive, it still requires concrete evidence that engaging in control strategies can act to increase perceived control after a direct loss of control.

The present research aimed to show that the psychological strategies people engage in when low in control can and do serve to increase perceived control. This work therefore provides a new theoretical lens through which to view belief in precognition as more than just an irrational indulgence. It reveals that such beliefs are not necessarily an irrational response to loss of control, but serve a psychological purpose of boosting perceived control in times of uncontrollability.

Experiment 1

Experiment 1 investigated the effect of loss of control on belief in precognition. Given the existence of a positive correlation between perceived control and belief in precognition, there are two possible directions that this effect might take. First, if control and precognition have a straightforward one-to-one relationship, then depriving people of control could reduce their endorsement of precognitive abilities. However, another relationship is possible, that depriving people of control may increase belief in precognition. This is because the existence of a positive association does not preclude the possibility that reducing one variable will trigger an increase in the other variable to take its place [36]. Such a hydraulic effect would be consistent with theorizing by Irwin and colleagues [19], [20] that paranormal beliefs like precognition develop as part of a coping mechanism to help people manage threat. It would also parallel findings by Kay and colleagues of hydraulic relationships between cognitions that provide order and stability following a loss of control [36]. To test whether loss of control increases or decreases belief in precognition, Experiment 1 measured these beliefs after people were exposed to a manipulation designed to prime feelings of high control or low control.

Method

Ethics Statement

The School of Psychology Student Research Ethics Review at the University of Queensland, Australia approved the procedures for the experiment. It is the policy of this Review Committee to obtain verbal rather than written consent and as such, participants provided verbal informed consent, recorded by the experimenter on a written log sheet.

Participants and Procedure

Eighty-five first-year psychology students participated in the experiment in exchange for partial course credit (63 female; Mage = 18.61, SD = 2.75). Control (high vs. low) was manipulated via a priming task in which participants recalled and wrote about a time they felt in control or a time that they felt they had no control [11], [35]. This experiment was part of a larger project that also manipulated financial threat (high vs. low) in the context of the Global Financial Crisis. There were no significant main (p = .684) or interactive effects (p = .165) of the threat manipulation on belief in precognition.

Belief in precognition was measured using four items from the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale ([46], “Some people have an unexplained ability to predict the future”; “Astrology is a way to accurately predict the future”; “The horoscope accurately tells a person’s future”; and “Some psychics can accurately predict the future”; α = .74) measured on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

Results and Discussion

The relevant data and syntax reported in this paper are available from the authors by request. As predicted, there was a significant effect of the control manipulation, F(1,83) = 4.93, p =.029, ηp2 = .056. Participants who recalled a time of low control reported greater belief in precognition (M = 2.75, SD = 1.27) than participants who recalled a time of high control (M = 2.17, SD = 1.12). This finding provides experimental evidence that people who feel low in control report believing in precognition more so than people who feel high in control. It is in these uncontrollable contexts that people most crave the comfort of knowing that the future is predictable.

The results echo findings by Whitson and Galinksy [11] that threats to control increase superstition, beliefs about events that cause bad luck. It is not surprising that precognitive beliefs would show a similar pattern to superstitious beliefs. First, correlational research has shown belief in superstitions and belief in precognition to be highly correlated [44]. Most superstitions share a common underlying theme of rendering people’s lives more predictable (i.e., both are predictive control strategies [24]). Nevertheless, the two beliefs are not isomorphic. Experiment 1 demonstrated an effect of control deprivation on precognition specifically.

In the following two experiments, our research goes beyond previous experimental work that demonstrates that loss of control heightens paranormal beliefs to test why this effect occurs. Specifically, in the following two experiments we tested our hypothesis that belief in precognition actually boosts perceived control and for this reason is endorsed to a greater degree when people feel as though they lack control.

Experiment 2

Researchers have argued that people use secondary strategies when control has been threatened because these strategies act to restore or otherwise compensate for loss of control[32][37]. More specifically, researchers have hypothesized that paranormal beliefs like precognition provide people with an enhanced sense of control [5], [19][22]. It seems plausible therefore that people are drawn to a belief in precognition because it provides them with a heightened sense of control.

To test whether belief in precognition increases perceived control, Experiment 2 included a manipulation designed to increase belief in precognition. We exploited a recent debate in the psychology literature to test this research question. Recently, Daryl Bem [3] published an article in the premier social psychology journal, the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, reporting scientific evidence for the existence of precognition. The paper inspired much attention and controversy, including a rebuttal article by Wagenmakers and colleagues[4] published in the same issue of JPSP. In Experiment 1, half of the participants read the abstract of Bem’s article showing experimental evidence for precognition. The other half read the abstract by Wagenmakers and colleagues debunking the notion that precognition exists. We hypothesized that people who read Bem’s claim that precognition exists would report greater perceived control than people who read the alternative claim that it does not exist.

Method

Ethics Statement

The School of Psychology Student Research Ethics Review at the University of Queensland, Australia approved the procedures for the experiment. It is the policy of this Review Committee to obtain verbal rather than written consent and as such, participants provided verbal informed consent, recorded by the experimenter on a written log sheet.

Participants and Procedure

Fifty-three participants (33 female; Mage = 18.96, SD = 3.01) were approached on the campus of a large Australian university and asked to participate in the experiment in exchange for a chocolate bar. Participants in the precognition condition read a paragraph stating that researchers had found evidence for the existence of precognition. Featured below the paragraph was the abstract of Bem’s [3] article on this topic. Participants in the no precognition conditionread that researchers had debunked the notion that precognition exists. Featured below the paragraph was the abstract of the rebuttal article by Wagenmakers and colleagues [4].

Following the precognition manipulation, perceived control was measured using three items (“I am in control of my own life”; “I am able to live my life how I wish”, “My life is determined by my own actions”, α = .76) on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

Results and Discussion

As predicted, there was a significant effect of the precognition manipulation on perceived control, F(1,51) = 4.19, p = .046, ηp2 = .076. Participants who read that precognition exists reported higher perceived control (M = 5.37, SD = 0.61) than participants who read that precognition does not exist (M = 4.75, SD = 1.41).

Experiment 2 demonstrated experimentally that informing people that precognition exists increases perceived control relative to informing them that precognition does not exist. This effect augments previous correlational findings of a positive association between belief in precognition and perceived control [21], [23]. Moreover, it helps to clarify why people are more likely to adopt paranormal beliefs of this sort in times of uncontrollability–because these beliefs act to increase perceived control. The finding supports theorizing that such beliefs are protective and help people to cope with loss of control [18][20]. To provide concrete evidence for this theorizing, however, it is necessary to test whether feelings of control are protected if people endorse a belief in precognition after experiencing a loss of control. The final experiment tested this full model that belief in precognition boosts perceived control particularly in times of uncontrollability.

Experiment 3

Experiment 1 provided evidence that loss of control increases belief in precognition. Experiment 2 demonstrated that belief in precognition increases perceived control. Experiment 3 combined these observations and tested a full theoretical model of control restoration. The main argument we put forward is that when people lack control, believing in precognition helps them to feel in control once more.

In generating this hypothesis, we drew on theorizing and research in the control literature. A weight of empirical evidence indicates that people seek to restore perceived control when it has been deprived [24], [30], [31], [47], [48]. More recent research has documented a range of strategies that people use to compensate for a lack of control [11], [32], [35], [39], [40]. We propose that heightened belief in precognition is another such compensatory strategy. Implicit in the control literature is the idea that people engage in these compensatory strategies because they act to increase feelings of control. We aimed to directly test whether these types of control strategies do indeed boost perceived control.

In order to demonstrate this full model, Experiment 3 manipulated both control and belief in precognition as in the previous experiments. We then measured subsequent ratings of perceived control. We hypothesized that belief in precognition would increase perceived control when participants were induced to feel low in control (but not when they were induced to feel high in control). The present research therefore directly tests whether compensatory control strategies act to boost perceived control. In addition to this theoretical advancement, Experiment 3 made a methodological improvement on Experiment 2 by including a baseline condition–a condition in which there was no mention of precognition–to compare against the precognition and no precognition conditions.

Method

Ethics Statement

The School of Psychology Student Research Ethics Review at the University of Queensland, Australia approved the procedures for the experiment. It is the policy of this Review Committee to obtain verbal rather than written consent and as such, participants provided verbal informed consent, recorded by the experimenter on a written log sheet.

Participants and Design

One hundred and thirty-two students (83 female; Mage = 20.28, SD = 4.34) completed the experiment in exchange for course credit. The experiment employed a 2 (induced low control vs. induced high control)×3 (precognition vs. no precognition vs. baseline) design with perceived control as the dependent variable.

Manipulations and Measures

Control was manipulated using the priming task from Experiment 1 in which participants recalled and wrote about a time they experienced control or no control. The precognition manipulation was similar to that in Experiment 2. Participants in the precognition condition read the abstract by Bem [3] with an explanatory paragraph titled “Precognition exists, psychologists find”. Participants in the no precognition condition read the abstract by Wagenmakers and colleagues [4] with an explanatory paragraph titled “Precognition does not exist, psychologists find”. We also added a baseline condition in which participants read the abstract of an article from the same issue of JPSP by Mahajan and colleagues [49]. The paper revealed that rhesus macaques can discriminate between members of their own and other social groups and was preceded by an explanatory paragraph titled “Psychologists find social discrimination in monkeys”.

Following the manipulations, perceived control was measured using five items (“I am in control of my own life”; “I am free to live my life how I wish”; “My life is determined exclusively by my own actions”; “I enjoy making my own decisions”; and “I enjoy having control over my own destiny”; α = .73) on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Analyses using only the first three items (replicating the perceive control scale from Experiment 2) yields a significant interaction, F(2,126) = 3.94, p = .022, ηp2 = .059, which follows the same pattern of results as those reported in the results section below.

Results and Discussion

There was no significant main effect of the control manipulation, F(1,126) = 0.09, p = .772, ηp2= .001, or the precognition manipulation, F(2,126) = 0.60, p = .549, ηp2 = .009. However, as expected, there was a significant interaction between the control and precognition manipulations, F(2,126) = 3.41, p = .036, ηp2 = .051.

Simple effects revealed that the effect of the precognition manipulation was not significant in the high control condition, F(2,126) = 0.76, p = .472, ηp2 = .012. In line with predictions, the effect of the precognition manipulation was significant in the low control condition, F(2,126) = 3.25, p = .042, ηp2 = .049. Simple comparisons revealed that within the low control condition, people in the precognition condition reported greater levels of perceived control (M = 5.76, SD = 0.66) than people in the no precognition condition (M = 5.19, SD = 0.69), p = .026, and the baseline condition (M = 5.21, SD = 1.09), p = .030; see Table 1.
Table 1 Means and simple comparisons of the effect of precognition condition within the low and high control conditions.
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Table 1. Means and simple comparisons of the effect of precognition condition within the low and high control conditions. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0071327.t001
Inspection of the alternative set of simple effects revealed that the effect of control was non-significant in the no precognition condition, F(1,126) = 046, p = .501, ηp2 = .004, and the baseline condition, F(1,126) = 1.28, p = .261, ηp2 = .010, but was significant in the precognition condition, F(1,126) = 5.15, p = .025, ηp2 = .039. Within the precognition condition, participants in the low control condition reported greater perceived control (M = 5.76, SD = 0.66), than participants in the high control condition (M = 5.18, SD = 0.87).

As expected, participants who were told that precognition exists reported feeling more in control compared to baseline participants or participants who were told that precognition does not exist. However, this effect emerged only when people were induced to feel low in control. When control was affirmed by having people recall a time that they felt capable and in charge, there was no effect of belief in precognition on perceived control. Under such conditions, people have no need for belief systems that will boost feelings of controllability, because they already feel capable of exerting control. It is when control is deprived that people cling to the belief that the future is predictable, and under such conditions holding this belief is palliative and functional in that it increases perceptions of control.

General Discussion

The present research demonstrated that loss of control increases belief in precognition and belief in precognition increases perceived control. Our first step was to demonstrate that when people lack control they report greater belief in precognition. In Experiment 1, people who were experimentally induced to feel low in control were more likely to believe in precognitive abilities. These findings add belief in precognition to the long list of compensatory control strategies that people use under conditions of uncontrollability [11], [32], [35], [39], [40].

Confirming long-standing observations of a correlational relationship between control and precognition [19], [23], [43], [45], Experiment 2 revealed that perceived control was higher when people were told that precognition exists relative to when they were told that precognition does not exist. Experiment 3 provided evidence for a full theoretical chain of control restoration. When control was deprived, belief in precognition increased the perception that one is in control of their life.

This finding makes an important addition to the compensatory control literature. There is a widespread assumption in the literature, supported indirectly, that many of the secondary strategies people engage in after a loss of control are in fact designed to increase perceived control. We made a direct test of this hypothesis, and demonstrated concretely that these strategies can succeed in increasing perceived control.

This work provides evidence that belief in precognition is a novel type of predictive control strategy [24]. Our findings demonstrate that people are drawn to prediction when they lack control, even when that prediction involves acknowledging the existence of paranormal abilities like precognition. This is because if the future is predictable, it can be controlled; a belief that is particularly attractive to people when they feel deprived of control.

The data in the present paper show that, on average, people tend to react to situational loss of control with heightened belief in precognition. In such contexts, precognitive belief is a reactive attempt to boost perceived control when it has been threatened. The fact that a positive correlation exists in the general population suggests the hypothesis that the boost in control may be short-lived. There may even be a distal cost to embracing a belief in precognition specifically as a defence against control deprivation. If this belief is subsequently disconfirmed, the threat to control may be even more intense. Longitudinal research is needed to identify how long the sensation of boosted control derived from reactive paranormal beliefs might last, and whether there is a rebound of vulnerability to threatened control in the longer term.

Conclusions

The present research has shown that beliefs about psychic predictability can provide the psychological system with a compensatory boost in perceived control. We found that people were drawn to predictability when they experienced loss of control–even to the extent of endorsing seemingly irrational beliefs about precognition. We propose, therefore, that these kinds of beliefs are not an unreasonable response to control deprivation. Indeed, to the extent that belief in precognition increases perceived control, people could be described as becomingfunctionally irrational by holding this or related beliefs when control is threatened.

On a practical note, our findings help to explain why interest in the predictive arts is highest in times of threat and uncertainty [12][17]. It is at these moments that individuals most feel the need to control the course of their lives. Belief in precognition meets this need by enabling people to feel that the future is predictable, and can therefore be controlled. Regardless of whether precognitive abilities actually exist, therefore, belief in their existence serves an important psychological function of boosting perceived control in times of uncertainty.

Author Contributions

Conceived and designed the experiments: KG WL MH. Performed the experiments: KG. Analyzed the data: KG. Contributed reagents/materials/analysis tools: KG WL MH. Wrote the paper: KG WL MH.


Marcelo Gleiser - The Nature Of Consciousness: A Question Without An Answer?

It's a little strange to read Marcelo Gleiser (a professor of physics and astronomy) riffing about consciousness at NPR's 13.7 Cosmos and Culture blog, since this tends to be the domain of philosopher Alva Noë on that blog, but it is an interesting article.

Gleiser is thinking hard about David Chalmers' "Hard Problem of Consciousness," i.e., what it is like to be conscious and how that happens from the 3.5 lb lump of fatty tissue in our skulls. He rejects the notion that consciousness is a by-product of neuronal activity, as well as the computational model (that we can simulate the brain and mind with a computer):
it becomes very hard to see how the subjective quality of the experiential mind will emerge from neuronal modeling in silicon chips: to capture thinking is not the same thing as capturing what the thinking is about.
I agree.

The Nature Of Consciousness: A Question Without An Answer?


by MARCELO GLEISER
August 07, 2013

How does our subjective reality emerge from the physical structures of the brain and body?
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Today I'd like to go back to a topic that leaves most people perplexed, me included: the nature of consciousness and how it "emerges" in our brains. I wrote about this a few months ago, promising to get back to it. At this point, no scientist or philosopher in the world knows how to answer it. If you think you know the answer, you probably don't understand the question:

Are you all matter?

Or, let's phrase it in a different way, a little less controversial and more amenable to a scientific discussion: how does the brain, a network of some 90 billion neurons, generate the subjective experience you have of being you?

Australian philosopher David Chalmers, now at New York University, dubbed this question "The Hard Problem of Consciousness." He did this to differentiate it from other problems, which he considers the "easy" ones, that is, those that can be solved through the diligent application of scientific research and methodology as it's being already done in cognitive neurosciences and in computational neuroscience. Even if some of these "easy" problems may take a century to solve, their difficulty doesn't even come close to that of the "hard" problem, which, some speculate, may be insoluble.

Note that, even if the hard problem may be insoluble, the majority of scientists and philosophers still stick to the hypothesis that matter is all there is and that "you" exist as a neuronal construction within your brain (and body, as the two are linked in many ways, not all understood yet).

Here are some of the problems Chalmers calls easy:
  • The ability to discriminate and react to external stimuli
  • The integration of sensorial information
  • The difference between a state of wakefulness and sleep
  • The intentional control of behavior
These questions are on the whole localized, amenable to a reductionist description of how specific parts of the brain operate as electrochemical circuitry through myriad neural connections.

Recently, Henry Markram from the Federal Polytechnic School in Lausanne, Switzerland, received a billion-euro grant to lead the Human Brain Project, a consortium of more than a dozen European institutions that intends to create a full-blown simulation of the human brain. For this, they will need a supercomputer capable of more than a billion-billion operations per second (exaflops, where "exa" stands for 1018), about 50 times faster than today's high-end machines. Optimists believe that such computing power is within reach, possibly before the end of this decade.

Of course, Markram's project, or the intent of modeling a human brain in full in a computer, clashes frontally with the notion of the hard problem.

Markram and the "computationalists" believe that if the simulation is sufficiently complete and detailed, including everything from the flow of neurotransmitters across each individual synapse to the amazingly complex network of the trillions of inter-synaptic connections across the brain tissue, that it will function just as a human brain does, including a consciousness in every way as amazing as ours. To them, the hard problem doesn't exist: everything can be obtained from pilling neuron upon neuron on computer chip models, as bricks compose a house, plus all the other building details, plumbing, wiring, etc.

Although we must agree that Markram's project is of enormous scientific importance, I can't quite see how a computer simulation can create something like a human consciousness. Perhaps some other kind of consciousness, but not ours.

Another philosopher from New York University (that ought to be an amazing department to work in), Thomas Nagel, argued that we are incapable of understanding what it is like to be another animal, with its own subjective experience. He took bats as an example, probably because they construct their sense of reality through echolocation and are so different from us. Using ideas from MIT linguist Noam Chomsky, who has argued that every brain has cognitive limitations stemming from its design and evolutionary functionality (for example, a mouse will never talk), Nagel showed that we will never truly understand what it is like to be a bat.

This is another way of thinking about Chalmers' hard problem, what philosopher Colin McGinn calls "cognitive closure." (McGinn has just left the University of Miami after much controversy. Who knows, maybe he will also join NYU's philosophy department?)

Back to McGinn's ideas, he and other "mysterians" defend the idea that our brains can only do so much and one of the things that it can't do is understand the nature of consciousness. Being a philosophical argument there is of course no scientific proof of this limitation (what physicists fondly call a "no-go theorem"), but McGinn makes a compelling case, arguing that the difficulty comes from consciousness being nowhere and everywhere in the brain, thus not amenable to the methodic reductionist analysis as we tend to do with scientific issues.

This being the case, it becomes very hard to see how the subjective quality of the experiential mind will emerge from neuronal modeling in silicon chips: to capture thinking is not the same thing as capturing what the thinking is about.

McGinn leaves the door open to more advanced intelligences, with brains designed in more capable ways than ours. Of course, unless you are Ray Kurzweil and are convinced that it is just a matter of time before machines will be able to not just simulate the mind but leave us all behind, we can't ever predict reliably whether such technological marvels will come to be. But even if a more advanced (machine?) intelligence one day figures out what consciousness is about, it seems that for today we will have to continue living with the mystery of not knowing.

Mind the Brain Podcast Episode 03 – Hallucinations and Designer Drugs (PLoS Blogs)

This is a very cool Mind the Brain podcast from PLoS Blogs, featuring Vaughan Bell, a clinical and research psychologist at King’s College in London. Vaughan is the author of the excellent psychology and neuroscience blog, Mind Hacks.




Mind the Brain Podcast Episode 03 – Hallucinations and Designer Drugs

By Ruchir Shah
Posted: August 7, 2013



For the third in my neuroscience podcast series, I chat with Vaughan Bell, who is a clinical and research psychologist at King’s College in London. Vaughan has an active interest in all areas of psychology and cognitive neuroscience, and writes about many of them on his blog, Mind Hacks.

In this podcast, we discuss one of Vaughan’s clinical research interests, which is hallucinations. What are they, and how are they diagnosed? We start by discussing some examples of hallucinations, and why auditory and visual hallucinations might be more common than other types, like taste or smell hallucinations. We then discuss the role that culture might play, and the interesting phenomenon that certain types of hallucinations are actually more common in specific countries.

When then move on to another of Vaughan’s academic interests, that of psychoactive drugs, and their potential relationship to hallucinations and psychosis. Finally, we end with a discussion about designer drugs, and how labs all over the world are synthesizing new psychoactive compounds much faster than governments could possibly ban then, effectively making the “war on drugs” irrelevant.

You can listen to and download the podcast here.

Please enjoy, and if you’re interested in learning more, you can read much of Vaughan’s writing at Mind Hacks. You can also read one of his scholarly publications on hallucinations here.



This work, unless otherwise expressly stated, is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License.

Thursday, August 08, 2013

Mary Midgley - Are Selves Unreal?


In part, this post serves as a counter-balance to the earlier post this morning from Steven Pinker, his defense of scientism. Mary Midgley is a British moral philosopher and served as a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Newcastle University. One of her most recent books is The Solitary Self: Darwin and the Selfish Gene (2010).

She is known for her work on science, ethics, animal rights, and, in particular, for her strong opposition to reductionism and scientism, and any attempts to make science a substitute for the humanities. From Wikipedia:

She has written extensively about what philosophers can learn from nature, particularly from animals. A number of her books and articles have discussed philosophical ideas appearing in popular science, including those of Richard Dawkins. She has also written in favour of a moral interpretation of the Gaia hypothesis. The Guardian has described her as a fiercely combative philosopher and the UK's "foremost scourge of 'scientific pretension.'"[1]
In the talk below, she argues against the growing consensus that there is no "real" self, only an illusion of self that offers a sense of continuity and coherence.


Mary Midgley - Are Selves Unreal?


From Hume to Dennett, philosophers often claim that the self is an illusion, and neuroscientists and psychologists are inclined to agree. But are they wrong?

Moral philosopher and "The UK's foremost scourge of scientific pretension" Mary Midgley (Guardian) debunks the establishment's attack on the self.